The Sam Stavisky Combat Reporting Award: Ingersoll, Cushman, Wicks, Tomlinson
Category sponsored by Walt Ford
1st Place: Sgt. G.P. Ingersoll, 1st Marine Logistics Group
Ingersoll wrote from Outpost Warhorse in Iraq that counterinsurgency training of the Iraqi army is paying important dividends, noting that the “dwindling Marine presence would have little effect on Anbar Province’s stablity. The Iraqi’s are ready.”
2nd Place: Sgt. Steve Cushman, MCAS Cherry Point
Honorable Mention: Cpl. Ryan Wicks, MCB Okinawa
Honorable Mention:Cpl. Ryan Tomlinson, 1st MLG
Honorable Mention: Sgt. G. P. Ingersoll, 1st MLG
Award-winning stories are published below
1st Place: Sgt. G.P. Ingersoll, 1st Marine Logistics Group
Corps, Iraqi Army Ready to Take the Gloves Off
COMBAT OUTPOST WARHORSE, Diyala, Iraq – The Corps helped write the book on counterinsurgency, and Iraqi soldiers have been studying.
In the wake of al-Anbar’s continued success against al-Qaida insurgents, and the recent advent of Provincial Iraqi Control, some of the top leaders from Marine military transition teams convened here to discuss incremental drawdown of Marine presence in Iraqi army affairs.
“The big thing is figuring out what’s next as the [I Marine Expeditionary Force] draws down in size on the MiTTs,” said Master Sgt. Daniel R. Masters, assistant operations adviser, Quick Reaction Force 2, 1st Iraqi army Quick Reaction Force. “In the past, we used to do a lot of training, right now our hand in the training is dropping to almost zero as they take control themselves.”
De-MiTT is a systematic reallocation of coalition adviser teams to higher echelons in the IA command structure as smaller Iraqi units become proficient enough to operate independently. Marines heading up the teams evaluate operations regularly and calculate a percentage grade, no different than an exam.
“It’s a monthly thing,” said Masters, 46, a native of Denver, Colo., “we look at them across all the war fighting spectrums; we evaluate from nuts and bolts, to putting full scale [operations] into action.”
Despite the many levels of the “warfighting spectrum,” the assessment sets out to answer a single question: Are they capable of functioning on their own?
“This brigade was evaluated as almost being capable of operating independently,” said Masters, a career grunt. “The Iraqis need less and less from us every week.”
Masters said the dwindling Marine presence would have little effect on Anbar’s stability. The Iraqis are ready.
“Ninety percent of what they do falls in line with what’s needed to maintain their own security,” Masters said.
Aside from a few remaining snags in terms of logistics, Marines here said IA counterinsurgency operations mirror Marine Corps doctrine.
“They know small unit tactics,” said Sgt. Bradley S. Wind, intelligence chief, 3rd Battalion, QRF 3, 1st IA QRF. “Battalion level operations are nothing to them, they can do them, their jundee (enlisted men) know what they’re doing.”
The end state of MiTT operations is to develop an Iraqi army capable of effectively replacing coalition units in Iraq. As far as Wind is concerned, the replacement phase is already beginning.
“They’re just as good as a Marine rifle company,” said Wind, 26, a native of Grandville, Mich.
Sgt. Leonard K. Cestaro, a grunt with two previous combat deployments, supported Wind’s assertion.
“They use hand and arm signals, moving like Marines, just like we taught them,” said Cestaro, 27, Anchorage, Alaska. “They need little to no correction.”
Cestaro said that the Iraqis know what the Corps taught them so well that sometimes IA Soldiers remind Marines of proper techniques. The IA’s and Marines’ relationship has formed around increased proficiency, which has bolstered the Marines’ confidence in their IA counterparts.
“When you’re patrolling with (IA Soldiers), and you’ve got one to your left and one to your right … with me as a Marine to be comfortable with that and have the state of mind that everything’s going to be okay,” said Cestano, “that’s when I know that they’re ready to take the gloves off.”
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2nd Place: Sgt. Steve Cushman, MCAS Cherry Point
Echo Marines adjust to ‘shoot and scoot’ tactics
HELMAND PROVINCE, Forward Operating Base Sangin, Afghanistan — A Marine squad on patrol through a local bazaar comes under fire from a small element of enemy fighters.
Before the Marines have a chance to effectively engage the enemy, the insurgents break contact and disappear into the warren of narrow alleyways on the far side of the bazaar.
When the Marines of Company E, Task Force 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Afghanistan, initially began operating here in June, contact with the enemy was very much “shoot and scoot,” said Capt. Matthew M. O’Donnell, Echo Company commander, and Glenelg, Md., native. Contact would normally be with a fire team-sized element and last only two-to-three minutes.
“They would engage our guys, try to inflict casualties and then break contact,” said O’Donnell who has prior experience serving in Afghanistan.
Headquartered in the Sangin District Center of Afghanistan’s Helmand River Valley, Echo Marines operated in one of the busiest areas of operation within TF 2/7’s battle space. Prior to arriving in theater, the Marines had prepared for a conventional fight with the enemy.
O’Donnell said he and his Marines were well prepared for the fight of their lives after having received several briefings from British forces also operating in the Sangin area.
Echo Company’s very first contact with the enemy was a slight aberration to the shoot and scoot tactics O’Donnell referenced. The enemy ambushed one of his squads in a cemetery behind the Sangin Bazaar with medium machine guns, automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades and indirect fire. During this engagement, however, the insurgents stayed in contact for awhile.
It wasn’t until the Marines threatened the enemy’s egress route that the insurgents broke contact from the original firing positions and took up secondary firing positions and continued to fight. Echo Company sent out a quick reaction force and coordinated fires with the Afghan National Army (ANA), moving in on the insurgent’s flank before they attempted to break contact again.
“That was our first contact. From what we had seen and been briefed on Sangin and the Helmand River Valley, our mindset coming in was very much set on preparing for a stand-up kinetic fight,” O’Donnell said. “The British forces that came and briefed us in the States while we were at Mojave Viper said they had been involved in multiple hour engagements at distances ranging from 50 to 400 meters.”
“That’s what the Marines were prepared to deal with,” O’Donnell continued. “So, when the shoot and scoots started happening, it was really frustrating. We had been trained to establish fire superiority and then begin to maneuver.”
“We knew that there had been an increase in the use of IEDs in Regional Command South,” O’Donnell said. “We didn’t expect such a high volume. I spent an entire year here as an advisor, and in that year, the units I worked with dealt with 25 IEDs. Our Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) responded to numerous IEDs within the first 30-45 days of being here. Overall, they dealt with more than 100 responses. That’s just in our area.”
August brought the beginning of the peak fighting season. This follows the time period when the poppy harvest, which takes place in May and June, is sold and the money comes back to the insurgents to be used to purchase weapons and ammunition. The weapons, ammunition and fighters are generally in place about the same time each year, which happens right around August.
Echo Marines were used to three or four significant events a day, as Sangin was regarded as the busiest district across the task force’s area of operations. As expected, Echo Marines experienced their worst round of fighting during August.
“Initial contact was a lot of gunfights, but it flipped over to IEDs pretty quick,” said Cpl. Clarence B. Smith, a squad leader and Teague, Texas native. “Once they realized we were going to maneuver on them immediately and not going to tactically withdraw and drop mortars on them, they switched to hitting us with IEDs.”
Around the same time, Echo began to work with their coalition partners and begin to use each other’s strengths to take the fight to the enemy. North of Sangin D.C., there was an area controlled by the ANA. The ANA was aggressive in patrolling and attempting to establish a presence, but they lacked the firepower and ability to coordinate movement of fires in the attack. So, Echo Company coordinated with the British and ANA forces in two separate movements-to-contact operations. During the first operation, the company advanced through 8-to-10 foot high cornfields, and had three sustained engagements over a span of three hours.
About two weeks later, the Marines again teamed up with British and ANA forces for a movement-to-contact operation in the same area. As coalition forces were picking up momentum, the Marines had already maneuvered on the insurgents.
“The operations went a long way in picking the morale of the company back up,” O’Donnell said. “We were able to use the skills and the ethos that are unique to the Marine Corps, our aggressiveness, and our ability to coordinate supporting assets in support of maneuver under fire. For the young Marines to be able to lead fire teams and squads aggressively in combat, that’s what they had trained to do. So, it felt good for them.”
“We had been very aggressive in patrolling,” O’Donnell explained. “We had done cordon and search operations, and we knew we had pushed the enemy out of his operating area prior to this. But, we just hadn’t been able to bring them to bear in battle; we hadn’t been able to say we killed six guys today. That may sound trivial, but that means a lot to the infantrymen on the ground — to know at the end of the day that there are a few of those guys who are never going to fight us again.”
Echo Company started finding that they were fighting a commuter insurgency. The enemy fighters were not remaining in the same place. They were keeping out of range of coalition forces. O’Donnell said the enemy was driving into “work,” shooting at coalition forces, blowing up IEDs, and then driving back out to their safe havens.
As Ramadan came into play, enemy kinetic activity started to die-off a little bit. Even after Ramadan, there was very sporadic activity, even to the point where EOD didn’t respond to an IED for nearly a week.
O’Donnell said Sangin is a difficult place to measure whether success has been made or not. The typical success Marines look for in a fight are the number of insurgents killed, weapons caches found and the number of detainees taken. But, if the patterns of enemy activity are taken into account, the enemy’s ability to attack the Marines consistently with effect has been greatly diminished.
However, the enduring metrics of success in a counterinsurgency fight and measured in more intangible ways, like the willingness of a population to accept rule of law and governance, and begin to take charge of their own future.
“Sangin is probably the most frustrating district as far as progress, yet the Marines have found ways to make invaluable contributions to the overall security situation,” O’Donnell said. “Even though the overall picture may not look as good as we want or those who are responsible for security here want it to look, it would look far worse if the Marines hadn’t done what they’ve done.”
Echo Company is not unique among the Marines who came to Afghanistan, as all Marine forces serving here are looking for contact with the enemy.
“When in contact, it’s very much a case of having to hold the dogs back. They want to go! These guys are aggressive; they’re controlled, but it’s what they train for and it’s what they want to do,” O’Donnell said. “I’ve been pretty impressed with them. This is far more challenging terrain to fire and maneuver in and to keep up deliberate attacks in than anything at Twentynine Palms (Calif.) Because of vegetation, your ability to command and control, see adjacent units and positively identify enemy positions is extremely difficult. So, the work that these squads and fire team leaders are doing is absolutely amazing.”
Staff Sgt. Kyle W. Lockhart, platoon sergeant for 3rd Platoon and Tabernacle, N.J., native said all of the Marines were performing flawlessly.
“The Marines’ reaction when IEDs were struck or found was flawless,” Lockhart said. “The experienced squad leaders and fire team leaders who really knew what they were getting into took care of the Marines the right way. There is a lot of natural leadership and ability in the platoon that we didn’t see before coming over here that we definitely see going home.”
“I can’t speak highly enough of everybody in the platoon,” Lockhart added. “I’ve never had a sense of pride like I do with this group of Marines. Having deployed before with other units, this is by far the most professional and toughest group of guys I’ve ever worked with.”
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Cpl. Ryan Wicks, MCB Okinawa
US, Korean forces rush beach
HWANJINRI BEACH, POHANG, South Korea (November 21, 2008) — A roar of explosions cut through the morning coastal haze of South Korea’s eastern shoreline signaling the beginning of an amphibious assault.
U.S. and Republic of Korea Marines and sailors conducted an amphibious beach landing Nov. 6 during, Korean Incremental Training Program 2009.
The annual bi-lateral exercise was conducted to improve interoperability and combat readiness among the two militaries while building on the long-standing alliance between the two nations.
In a combined effort, U.S. Marine and Navy commanders from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit and Essex Expeditionary Strike Group along with R.O.K. commanders from 1st R.O.K Marine Division and Navy Amphibious Squadron 53, worked together to plan and execute the landing.
“The focus of the Essex ESG is on improving the capability of a combined R.O.K.-U.S. force,” said Capt. Donald A. Schmieley, commander of Amphibious Squadron 11. “This exercise provides us with the perfect environment to expand both R.O.K. and U.S. proficiency in a variety of areas.”
The exercise began at approximately 10 a.m. with simulated airstrikes along the shoreline. Paratroopers descended over coastal mountains to join the fight.
Soon afterward, a swarm of R.O.K. and U.S. military aircraft approached the beach through the coastal mist while deploying flares to simulate fire support.
Amphibious assault vehicles from both forces pushed forward through a thick smokescreen designed to mask their approach.
Once the AAVs reached the shore, Marines poured out and immediately began to storm the beach.
Some Marines began setting up communications and mortars while others rushed to find a position to provide security and fire support.
Soon after the U.S. Marines hit the shore, another platoon of R.O.K. Marines joined the fight via Landing Craft Air Cushioned vehicles. As soon as their boots hit the sand, they assaulted through the beach toward their objective deeper inland.
Assets for the mission from R.O.K. and U.S. forces equated to more than 25 ships, 60 Amphibious Assault Vehicles, four LCAC’s, and more than 30 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft as well as AV-8B Harrier jets.
“Although the bi-lateral training is an extremely important part of the exercise, one of our primary goals is to build cohesion, camaraderie and esprit de corps amongst our forces,” said Col. Paul Damren, commanding officer of the 31st MEU. “These are the capabilities that will carry the day when times are toughest.”
“It’s important to have our forces working together because it prepares us for real world situations in which we could be fighting alongside one another,” said 1st Lt. Junsik Sim, a comptroller with R.O.K Marine Corps’ 1st Marine Division.
(Note: To read this article as it ran, go here http://www.okinawa.usmc.mil/public%20affairs%20info/Archive%20News%20Pages/2008/081121-korea.html)
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Honorable Mention: Cpl. Ryan Tomlinson, 1st MLG
Seven Mary Three: Team Mustang Patrols the Highways
AL ANBAR PROVINCE, Iraq – “Route Mobile is a main artery in western Al Anbar province,” said Sgt. Justin O. Smallwood, a scout squad leader with Team Mustang, 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, Regimental Combat Team 5. “It’s our job to keep that road safe as well as maintain influence over its residents.”
Marines with Team Mustang embark on these operations every day ensuring the residents between the cities of Rutbah and Ramadi are safe from danger. Eventually, this task will fall on the Iraqi highway patrol, but for now, Team Mustang is doing all they can to ensure safe roadways.
Team Mustang is a new company with 2nd LAR comprised of one platoon from each company in the battalion. The group was created to have a fast and mobile presence along one of the main highways of Iraq.
“We have a presence on Route Mobile to deny the enemy the ability of using the road to their advantage,” said Staff Sgt. Charles F. Reynolds, 30, company gunnery sergeant, Team Mustang, from Franklin, Mass.
Since assuming control of the area from 3rd LAR, Team Mustang has hit the ground running, engaging in combat patrols throughout Route Mobile. They have started to work with the IHP as they prepare to take the reigns from coalition forces.
The Marines took time during a patrol on May 10 to visit citizens along Route Mobile to ensure there was no insurgent activity. They foot-patrolled through a large oasis along the highway the company calls “the woods” and handed out candy to the children who live there.
“It’s a good experience having an opportunity to talk and interact with the people,” said Smallwood, 23, from Great Falls, Va., who is on his second tour in Iraq. “Learning how the citizens have changed from last year is great. They are good people that are very cooperative and welcoming.”
Team Mustang will continue to maintain security of the highway with the IHP and ensure insurgents do not harm the citizens of the area until the day they hand over all of the responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces.
(Note: To read this article as it ran, go here: http://www.dvidshub.net/?script=news/news_show.php&id=19492